Worker Assault Leads to Court Case in Youngstown, Ohio

Situated on the north bank of the Mahoning River, the city of Campbell, named for an early 20^th Century steel industry executive, is a suburb of Youngstown, Ohio.

An individual identified in court records only as “M.A.” (presumably to protect his privacy) was working for Republic Services, a company under contract with the city to collect residential trash.  As an operations supervisor, his duties included handling customer problems and complaints.

Nicole Carter was a problem customer.  M.A. had been to her house several times to deal with her repeatedly placing construction debris, considered "unacceptable waste," for curbside pickup along with her residential garbage.  On each visit he explained that Republic’s contract with the city is to remove only standard residential solid waste and that residents must make separate arrangements for removal of construction debris.  

On March 21, 2022, M.A. went to Carter’s home because she, once more, had placed construction material and debris at curbside along with her residential garbage. He had no conversation with her at that time, but he did discuss the matter with the individual doing work there.  As a courtesy, M.A. removed the items himself.  However, he advised the contractor that they should not be left at the curb with the usual residential trash.  

Nine days later, he was called to Carter's residence for the same issue. This time he told her, face-to-face, exactly what items cannot be left at curbside for pickup with residential garbage.  She then became belligerent and made derogatory statements about Republic and its employees. Still, as a gesture, he removed the materials.  

On August 3, 2022, the route driver notified M.A. that an unacceptable item (a five-foot mirror) had been placed at the curb at Carter’s home.  Arriving at the residence, he was confronted in the driveway by Carter who escalated the situation with threatening profanities.  

Refusing to engage in similar coarseness and seeking to diffuse the tension, M.A. retreated to his truck to call his boss.  Although the door of his truck was closed and the window was up, he nonetheless could hear Carter talking on the phone with Republic and complaining about the matter.

M.A. later testified that Carter opened up his door and punched him in the arm. He had not threatened Carter or otherwise invited the attack, did not defend himself, and was not injured.  After striking M.A., Carter took the mirror from the back of his truck (M.A. had removed it from the curb) and crashed it on the pavement, causing it to shatter into many pieces.  M.A. got out, picked up the frame of the mirror, threw it onto his truck, and drove away.  He called the city to

report broken glass in the street and notified the police of the incident.

Later, at police headquarters, M.A. gave an initial report to Sergeant Timothy Rauschenbach regarding the incident at Carter's residence. Sergeant Rauschenbach attempted to contact Carter but was unsuccessful.  Upon further investigation by a detective, a criminal complaint was filed against Carter charging assault, a first-degree misdemeanor, by “knowingly caus[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm” to M.A.

A jury trial was held in Campbell Municipal County Court.  After the State concluded its case, the defense moved for an acquittal which was denied by the trial judge.  The defense then rested without presenting evidence.  The verdict: Guilty as charged.

The trial judge sentenced Carter to 180 days in jail with 159 days suspended, 21 days imposed. She was ordered to pay a $400 fine plus costs. The court placed her on one-year probation with the condition that she undergo a psychological evaluation and follow through with all recommended treatment. She was further ordered to have no contact with M.A. or his employer.

On appeal, Carter first argued that her conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.  The test is whether a reasonable jury, weighing the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The three-judge appellate panel rejected her contention, finding the verdict consistent with the evidence and fully supported.

The trial judge had instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that Carter knowingly caused physical harm to M.A. and that such harm means “any injury, illness, or other psychological impairment, and regardless of its gravity or duration."   Carter argued that she could not be found guilty because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of physical harm.    

“The record is clear that [Carter] struck M.A,” said the panel. “[Carter’s] act of violence was done without any provocation from M.A. * * *  [W]hether M.A. sustained a lasting or discernable injury, or whether he sought or needed medical . . . is irrelevant here.  In fact, the defining statute . . . specifically excludes a requirement as to the 'gravity or duration' of any injury.  * * *  Based on the evidence presented,  . . . the jury did not clearly lose its way in finding [Carter] guilty of assault.”

Carter also argued that she was denied effective assistance of counsel in her trial in violation of her rights under the U.S. and Ohio constitutions.  To prove it, she had to show that her lawyer’s performance fell outside a range of reasonable professional assistance and that the outcome of her case was likely affected as a result.  Vague speculation on her part about prejudice from defective representation would not be enough.  The appeals court found her  counsel’s performance neither deficient nor prejudicial.                                                            

 (Carter’s trial counsel appears to have been the third attorney in her case.  Attorney No. 1 represented her in pre-trial hearings and, after no resolution was reached, Carter discharged her. 

About a month later, with a jury trial pending, Attorney No. 2 filed his appearance in her behalf, but, with the court’s permission, withdrew as counsel eight days later.)

In particular, Carter took issue with her counsel's jury selection strategy, specifically with respect to Juror 39, and alleged it amounted to ineffective assistance.  That claim would be very difficult to sustain given that appeals courts seldom attempt to evaluate with hindsight the strategic decisions of trial counsel, including jury selection.

Juror 39 had been a victim of a crime but said he could be “fair and impartial” in Carter’s case and "give both sides deference and listen to all the evidence.”  Outside the presence of the other jurors, Juror 39 told the trial judge that his wife works for Republic Services and he met M.A. at a company Christmas party but he "didn't know [M.A.] real well."  The following exchange occurred:

PROSECUTOR: Was anything about that interaction, would it affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror?

JUROR: I don't believe so.

PROSECUTOR: Do you believe that you can hear the evidence, both favorable and disfavorable to the State, and still render a fair and impartial verdict?

JUROR: I believe I can.

PROSECUTOR: And if necessary, even though you know him, could you find the defendant not guilty if you believe that the State had not met its burden of proof?

JUROR: Yes.

PROSECUTOR: And likewise, do you think that knowing this individual would cause you to automatically be in favor of the State's position in finding the defendant guilty?

JUROR: No.

PROSECUTOR: No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm satisfied that the juror's impartial. I think we should proceed. Counsel?

TRIAL COUNSEL: I believe - - I mean, he answered all the questions correctly, . . . . I think it boils down to whether or not you would be swayed one way or - - one way or another for or even against [M.A.] because of your interaction. So, I mean - -

JUROR: No. I have no feelings towards the man one way or the other.

Based on these answers, Carter’s attorney declined to challenge or remove the juror.

“The record reveals no error amounting to ineffective assistance in trial counsel's selection with respect to any of the jurors, particularly Juror 39,” the panel wrote. “This court should not second-guess trial counsel's voir dire decisions and strategy.”

Carter also alleged her trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in playing a video of M.A. speaking with the police on August 3, 2022, in an attempt to show an inconsistency between that conversation and M.A.'s courtroom testimony as to when he went to Carter’s home for the first time. At trial, M.A. said he went to her home in March 2022.  In the video, M.A. said he went to her home in February 2022 for the same construction debris issue.

As Carter saw it, her trial counsel failed to attack the inconsistency.  The appeals court was unimpressed.  “[W]hether M.A. went to [Carter’s] residence for the first time in February 2022 or March 2022 is irrelevant as to the August 3, 2022 date of the assault.,” the panel said. “The playing of the video, and any follow-up questions thereafter, do not change the outcome in this case and do not amount to ineffective assistance.”

State v. Carter, No. 23 MA 0092, Ohio Ct. App., Seventh Dist., May 31, 2024.