Rumpke Enters Court Battle Over Fatal Landfill Incident in Hamilton County, Ohio

When Ance Jones headed to work on the morning of July 8, 2020, he probably expected the same old routine.  He surely didn’t figure it would be his last day alive.

 Ance, who was employed by Superior Environmental Solutions, was at the Rumpke Sanitary Landfill that day to dump sludge.  The site, located in Hamilton County, north of Cincinnati, Ohio, is the largest landfill in the state and one of the largest landfills in the country.

While at the working face, he was knocked down by trash being disgorged from a  Cincinnati city garbage truck and was partially covered by trash and sludge. Rumpke employees removed him from the pile and called emergency responders, but Ance shrugged off medical treatment and returned to his truck. He then drove to another part of the site where drivers often park to check in with their supervisors, carry out other tasks, or take a short break before driving off.  Ance eventually left the landfill, but not on his own.

 At around 1:00 a.m. the following day, Rumpke workers found him unresponsive in his truck. An autopsy determined that he had died from "an acute cardiac event caused by arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease which was exacerbated by the physical and emotional distress of having a large pile of garbage and sludge dumped on him."

Karen Jones, on behalf of the estate of her late husband, sued the city, truck driver Jamie Mark Davis and Rumpke, alleging that the defendants caused her husband’s death through their negligence.

Following discovery, the city defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming (a) that they were immune from suit under a state law that shields cities when they are operating motor vehicles and (b) that the landfill incident was not the proximate cause of her husband’s death. Additionally, Davis argued that Jones could not show that he was the driver of the city garbage truck that dumped trash on her late husband.

 In response, Jones argued that the city was not entitled to immunity because the city garbage truck was parked when the incident occurred and that Davis had no immunity because his actions were reckless.  Regarding the cause of death, Jones supported her opposition to summary judgment with affidavits from the deputy coroner who examined Ance and from a cardiologist. Both expressed the opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the stress of the incident at the landfill, combined with Ance's preexisting heart disease, caused his death. Lastly, Jones argued that the circumstantial evidence pointed to Davis being the driver of the implicated truck.

For its part, Rumpke asserted that it was entitled to summary judgment because Jones did not offer any expert testimony to establish what, if any, duty of care Rumpke allegedly owed Ance and that Jones could not show that Rumpke's alleged negligence directly caused his death.

Jones rebutted by arguing that Rumpke was obliged to provide Ance the same duty of care that any owner of property owes to an invitee and that no expert testimony is necessary to establish the existence of that duty.  She again referred to the affidavits of the deputy coroner and the cardiologist to counter Rumpke's argument that its alleged negligence did not cause Ance's death.

The trial judge ruled that the city defendants were entitled to political-subdivision immunity because, without dispute, the city garbage truck was dumping garbage.  Under Ohio law, the dumping of garbage from a garbage truck does not constitute "operation of [a] motor vehicle" for the purposes of the immunity law. In addition, the trial court ruled in favor of Rumpke, finding no evidence to establish that Rumpke had a legal obligation to Ance.  Finally, the court determined, even if such a duty existed, Jones could not show that Rumpke's alleged negligence caused Ance's death. 

The trial court addressed Jones’s claim that Rumpke should have had a "spotter" to direct the flow of traffic near the working face of the landfill, noting that she presented nothing to support the proposition that a spotter must be present at all times at a landfill. Further, the trial court stated:

                    There is no set of facts that would lead Rumpke to foresee any person having a heart

                    attack because of the lack of a spotter. It is foreseeable that a person could be hit by

                    a truck, it is even foreseeable that garbage could be dumped on a person. However,

                    in this case, there was no way for Rumpke to foresee a person having a major heart

                    attack hours after a minor dumping incident.

The trial court entered summary judgment for the city defendants and Rumpke.  Doing so, the court effectively told Jones that, despite what she had amassed by way of affidavits and considerable deposition testimony, her lawsuit had no legal merit.  But the matter did not end there.

On appeal, Jones argued that the trial court was wrong in finding no duty on the part of Rumpke.  On the contrary, Jones asserted, Ance being an invitee on Rumpke’s premises, made Rumpke responsible under the principle of premises liability. 

Premises liability is a form of negligence.  The duty of care in a premises-liability case is based on the status of the plaintiff on the property: trespasser, licensee or invitee.  Invitees are business visitors to the property who are sought, expressly or implicitly, to provide an economic benefit to the owner.  Generally, a landowner owes its invitees a duty to maintain the premises

in a reasonably safe condition, which includes an obligation to warn of latent or hidden dangers but not obvious hazards.  In addition, a landowner must warn invitees when it is aware of the likelihood of negligent conduct by third parties on the premises.

Rumpke argued that summary judgment was appropriate because Jones failed to be specific in her complaint about premises liability and failed to establish a duty by producing an expert witness to establish the standard of care for proper landfill operation.  The three-judge appellate panel disagreed.

“In this case,” the panel noted, “Jones pleaded that Rumpke was negligent and identified certain measures that Rumpke failed to use to ameliorate the dangerous conditions on its premises. This is sufficient to give Rumpke notice that Jones was arguing a duty based on premises liability.”

Jones had retained a liability expert, Neal Bolton, but decided not to use his testimony in her case-in-chief, but rather have it available for rebuttal purposes only. “The jury can determine that the Defendants were negligent without the need for expert testimony,” the panel said. “Accordingly, we hold that Jones was entitled to argue her theory of premises liability in her response to Rumpke's motion for summary judgment.”

The appeals court found it indisputable that Rumpke owns and operates the landfill where the garbage-dumping incident occurred and where Ance died and that Ance was an invitee on Rumpke's premises. Moreover, the panel noted, the record contained testimony from multiple depositions showing that the safety guidelines requiring trucks to space at least 15 feet apart and park parallel to each other are necessary to prevent, among other harms, garbage from being ejected onto people on the working face. Additionally, Jones cited deposition testimony showing that Rumpke knew of widespread failure to follow these safety precautions.

“Under these circumstances,” the panel found, “Jones adequately showed the existence of a duty Rumpke owed Ance . . . a duty to exercise reasonable care, just like any property owner owes invitees on the premises.”

Jones also challenged the trial court's determination that Rumpke's alleged negligence did not proximately cause Ance's death.  Rumpke argued that the primary cause of death was Ance’s preexisting coronary heart disease, which manifested in chest pains he suffered before the incident. Jones had countered with affidavits from the two doctors.

Under Ohio law, where some event or circumstance combines with a defendant’s negligence to produce a death, the defendant is not exonerated if the plaintiff proves that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the harm.  

“In a case with sufficient medical expert testimony suggesting that the decedent's death was ‘substantially hastened’ by injury, the plaintiff is entitled to have the question resolved by the [jury],” the panel wrote. “Because we have held that Rumpke did owe a duty of care to Ance, and there are genuine issues of material fact . . .  the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Rumpke.”

With respect to the summary judgment in favor of the city defendants, Jones argued that the city was not entitled to political-subdivision immunity where, as she alleged, it negligently mismanaged a motor vehicle in the fashion it did. In addition, Jones claimed that Davis was not entitled to immunity due to his reckless conduct.

Similar to what prevails in many states, Ohio law gives a city immunity for injury allegedly caused by any act or omission of the city or its employee in connection with a governmental or proprietary function except in certain situations, including where the harm stems from the operation of a motor vehicle by a city employee within the scope of their employment.

According to the appeals court, the only relevant question in determining the city’s immunity was whether the operation-of-a-motor-vehicle exception applied. Although the state statute does not provide a definition of "operation" with respect to motor vehicles, court precedents hold that, for purposes of immunity, the negligent operation of a motor vehicle means carelessness in driving or otherwise causing the vehicle to be moved.  Would engaging the waste-dumping apparatus constitute “operation” of a motor vehicle?  That was not where the appeals court focused.

Jones argued that Davis was negligent in parking the truck too close to Ance and at an

angle. Jones supported her assertion with the deposition of a Rumpke employee and several exhibits. By parking too close to Ance's truck, she asserted, Davis created the conditions to dump garbage on Ance.

“We agree that backing up the truck to park, in preparation to offload garbage, clearly constitutes ‘driving or otherwise causing the vehicle to be moved’ [a]nd a reasonable jury could conclude that it was the negligent parking that caused garbage to be dumped on Ance,” the panel said. “We hold therefore that Jones has produced sufficient evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that the city is not entitled to immunity at this stage of the proceedings.”

 Beyond the issue of the city's immunity, however, was the question of Davis's immunity as an employee of the city.  He could be shielded from liability unless Jones were able to show that he acted outside the scope of his employment or behaved maliciously, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.  “[W]here there is a factual dispute as to whether the employee acted in a wanton or reckless manner, the question is . . . for the jury,” the panel continued.

 Jones stressed that the city policy for garbage truck drivers requires that drivers (1) allow 15 feet of distance between trucks at the working face of the landfill, (2) park parallel to other trucks at the working face, and (3) never wear earphones while on the working face. City officials in their deposition testimony explained that this policy is intended to prevent a city truck from ejecting trash onto another person or truck and that Davis knew or should have known how to act because the city trains each driver on department policies.  Notably, Davis himself admitted in his deposition that he violated the 15-foot rule and was wearing earphones the entire time he was at the landfill.  Moreover, deposition testimony from Rumpke employees confirmed that the truck next to Ance had been parked closer than 15 feet and at an angle.

“While the violation of a statute, ordinance, or departmental policy enacted for the safety of the public is not per se willful, wanton, or reckless conduct, it may be relevant to determining the culpability of a course of conduct,” the panel wrote.  “We hold that Jones has demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact whether Davis acted in a wanton or reckless manner, which would disqualify him from receiving immunity. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate, and the issue must be decided by the jury at trial.”

Things took an odd turn when the city defendants, after acknowledging sufficient witness testimony that the truck parked next to Ance was a city garbage truck, as indicated by the city's insignia on the side of the truck, argued that Jones could not show that Davis was the driver of the truck that was involved in the incident. To support this claim, they relied on deposition testimony from Rumpke employees that at least three city garbage trucks had entered the landfill in the time between Ance's arrival and the incident and that neither Davis nor his helper on the truck, recalled anything out of the ordinary while dumping trash at the landfill.

The appeals court, however, referred to undisputed evidence – a timeline of the arrival of various city trucks – to support a reasonable inference that only Davis's truck could have been the one to dump garbage on Ance. The dumping incident occurred at 2:01 p.m. Rumpke's records show that Ance passed the scale house at 1:36 p.m.  Davis's garbage truck passed the scale house at 1:43 p.m.  Two more city garbage trucks passed the scale house at 1:48 p.m. and 1:52 p.m.  Rumpke's records do not show any other city garbage trucks of the type involved in the incident as going past the scale house between 1:30 p.m. and 2:01 p.m. When there is no traffic between the scale house and the working face, the drive takes from five to ten minutes. Depending on the traffic, the wait time to access the working face ranges from twenty minutes to two hours.

“Based on this evidence, a jury could conclude from the timing of Davis's arrival and the time to drive to the working face that Davis's truck is the only city garbage truck that could have been present for the dumping incident,” the panel said.

With so many factual issues for a jury to decide, the appeals court overturned the trial court’s ruling in favor of the city defendants and Rumpke and remanded the case for further proceedings.  Unless the parties reach a settlement, the matter will go to trial.

Jones v. Davis, et al., No. C-230658, Ohio Ct. App., First Dist., Aug. 7, 2024.